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Introduction  
America lacks a grand strategy for waging the Global War on Terrorism. Though the Bush 
Administration and the military leadership understand that this will be a long and difficult conflict, 
we have no clear national policy to guide the day-to-day conduct of this war, including firm 
declaration of whether the Department of State or Defense is the lead federal agency.  
Like the era of a Soviet threat, the United States needs a proven strategy to counter the terrorist 
threat. George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” of 1947 (the foundational document of America’s Cold 
War “containment” policy) provides a suitable framework for developing a strategy for defeating 
the Islamic Fundamentalist movement that has grown out of Sunni Wahabbi extremism, and 
employs terror attacks as its primary method of operation. What follows is a strategic and policy 
prescription for the war on terrorism, adapted from Kennan’s distinctive work.  
Part I  
The political personality of Islamic Fundamentalist terrorism as we know it today is the product of 
ideology and circumstance—ideology inherited by the present terrorist leaders from the 
movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now 
have exercised for two decades since the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Few tasks of 
psychological analyses are more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces 
and the relative role of each in the determination of global terrorist conduct. Nevertheless, the 
attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.  
The set of ideological concepts with which the terrorist leaders came into power are extensive 
and complex, but Sunni Wahabbi ideology, in its extremist projection, has always been in process 
of subtle evolution. The outstanding features of jihadist thought as it existed in the early 1980s 
can be summarized as follows:  
1. that the central factor in the life of man, the factor which determines the character of 
public life, is the Wahabbi interpretation of Sunni Islam;  
2. that the democratic, Western capitalist society is a nefarious one which inevitable leads 
people away from Allah;  
3. that democracy and capitalism contain the seeds of their own destruction and must, in 
view of the inability of the secular polity to adjust itself to global change, result eventually 
and inescapably in a revolutionary transfer of power to the emerging caliphate of the 
Islamic world; and  
4. that imperialism, the final phase of democratic capitalism, leads directly to war and 
revolution.  
The rest may be outlined in Bin Ladin's own words:  
“It has become clear that the West in general and America in particular have an unspeakable 
hatred for Islam…Terrorism against America deserves to be praised because it was a response 
to injustice, aimed at forcing America to stop its support for Israel, which kills our people. We say 
that the end of the United States is imminent, whether Bin Laden or his followers are alive or 
dead, for the awakening of the Muslim umma (nation) has occurred. It is important to hit the 
economy (of the United States ), which is the base of its military power...If the economy is hit they 
will become preoccupied.”[1]  
It must be noted that there was no assumption that America and allied, un-Islamic governments 
would perish without attacks from outside. A final push was needed from a jihadist movement in 
order to enable the coming of the third caliphate. But it was regarded as inevitable that sooner or 
later push would be given.  
Part II  
This historical summary provides the context of the political personality of Islamic extremist power 
as we know it today.  
The fundamentalists have officially rejected nothing of the original ideology. Belief is maintained 
in the intrinsic depravity of democratic capitalism and Western mores, in the inevitability of its 
destruction and in the obligation of the Islamic faithful to assist in that destruction and to take 
power into their own hands. But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts that relate 
most specifically to the Islamic Fundamentalist regime itself: to its position as the sole truly 
righteous regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it.  
The most powerful of these concepts is that of the inherent conflict between democratic 
capitalism and Islam. That concept is deeply imbedded in foundations of terrorist ideology. It has 
profound implications for the extremists’ conduct as members of a new international order, one 
where state boundaries are less important than the unity of the greater Islamic community. 
Because of this new and growing phenomenon there can never be on Islamic Fundamentalism’s 
side an assumption of a community of aims between the true believers and powers that are 
regarded as non-believers.  
The aims of the democratic capitalist world are antagonistic to Islam, and therefore to the 
interests of the people it controls. If individual extremists or Islamic governments occasionally set 
their signature to documents that would indicate the contrary, this would be regarded as a tactical 
maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in 
the spirit of al-Taqiyyah.[2] Basically, the antagonism remains. But we should not be misled by 
tactical maneuvers. These characteristics of the terrorists’ policy, like the postulate from which 
they flow, are basic to the internal nature of Wahabbi power, and will be with us, whether in the 
foreground or the background, until the extremist nature of Islamic Fundamentalist power is 
appropriately identified, challenged, and eliminated.  
Consequently, the West—specifically the United States—will continue to face terrorist threats in 
the foreseeable future. The enemy must be recognized as embarked upon a do-or-die path to 
defeat Western society, regardless of the cost to its own people—including sacrificing their own 
lives. Despite their theory of the inevitabile fall of democratic capitalism implying an eventual 
victory, Osama bin Laden and his followers have declared their intent to hasten the downfall of 
the West. Their intent is viscious, their tactics bloody, and their aggression ongoing.  
The sub-state and apocalyptic nature of Islamic fundamentalism make it more difficult to deal with 
than the threat of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler, or even state-based 
monoliths such as the Soviet Union. This enemy is less sensitive to contrary force, more able to 
disperse its forces and withstand the blows of direct combat while choosing the time and place of 
its own increasingly lethal attacks—which includes their increasing access to the technology for 
developing, testing and employing weapons of mass destruction.  
Further, Islamic fundamentalism cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on 
the part of its opponents or the loss of a sanctuary, such as Afghanistan. The very nature of the 
enemy dictates that it can adjust, adapt and move across borders in ways that defy traditional 
armies. And its patience and persistence, with which it develops further attacks, means this 
enemy can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims 
of global democratic opinion, but only by intelligent long-term policies on the part of all the 
terrorists' adversaries—policies no less steady in their purpose than those of the Islamic 
Fundamentalists themselves.  
It is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the terrorist threat must be 
that of firmly and vigilantly diminishing the appeal of their extremist beliefs while simultaneously 
defeating the core terrorists who are actively plotting to attack the US and its interests. The 
terrorist leaders are keen users of propaganda, and as such they are highly conscious of any 
appearance of weakness on the part of their enemy. They are quick to exploit evidence of such 
weakness as signs of the righteousness of their cause.  
For these reasons it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Islamic Fundamentalists that the 
United States should remain at all times aggressive and resolute in its efforts to counter the 
appeal and the tactics of terrorist movements.  
Part III  
In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the terrorist pressure against the free 
institutions of the western world is something that cannot be merely contained by diplomacy alone, 
and must instead be met with a two-pronged approach: diminishing the appeal of Islamic 
Fundamentalist extremism while simultaneously defeating terrorist aggression.  
The terrorists look forward to a period of hegemony over the West—and they believe they have 
already scored great successes. We must bear in mind that the fame and reputation of the 
terrorists are expanding; indeed, there was a time when the Fundamentalist ideology represented 
far more of a minority in the sphere of Islamic countries than that ideology today represents in the 
world community as a whole.  
Free and open societies must reverse this tide of acceptance of extremists’ beliefs even as it 
actively destroys those whose minds cannot be changed and whose aggression is already in 
motion.  
The terrorist leaders, taking advantage of the contributions of modern technology, have solved 
the question of obedience from the people who live in Islamic nations. They have branded 
moderate and modern regimes as apostates and declared their rulers “un-Islamic,” calling their 
violent overthrow a duty to Allah. Few in their own community openly challenge their religious 
authority; and even those who do are unable to make that challenge valid as against the entire 
community of believers.  
The al Qaida leadership has also proven able to accomplish its purpose of building alliances with 
and inspiring regional terror groups—including those in Bali, Madrid and Riyadh. This has led to a 
terrible cost in human life, and in human hopes and energies, as previously insignificant groups 
have become emboldened by a sense of unity with the global terrorist movement. This has, in 
turn, necessitated the use of stricter laws and internal security powers on a scale unprecedented 
in modern times under conditions of peace—further fueling the fires that propel these regional 
conflicts.  
The war on terrorism has exacted a tremendous toll in destruction, death and human exhaustion. 
But the terrorists are certain to continue the fight, and we must continue the fight as well. The 
appropriate means is to attack the underlying causes of terrorism by diminishing its appeal to 
those who can be dissuaded from violence and terrorism, while simultaneously attacking and 
defeating those who cannot.  
The proliferation of the technology, materials and means of delivery for chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear weapons also play an important part in dictating that we act immediately 
to find a solution for the threats posed by Islamic Fundamentalist extremists. It is the potential—or 
rather inevitable—marriage of terrorists’ methods with the inherent capabilities of such weapons 
to do great harm that further demands a vigilant and aggressive American response.  
Part IV  
It is clear that the United States cannot expect to enjoy political accord with Islamic 
Fundamentalists. Their absolutist ideologies, intolerance for peace and democracy, and terrorist 
methods all belie the notion of peaceful co-existence. Therefore, the United States must continue 
to regard these ideologies as not merely a potential threat but as a clear and present danger. It 
must continue to expect that the enemy’s policies will reflect no love of peace or stability, no faith 
in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Islamic Fundamentalist and democratic 
capitalist worlds, but rather a persistent state of conflict.  
Balanced against this is the fact that, if America decides to sacrifice other wants and needs to 
fully focus on diminishing the appeal of the terrorist ideology while defeating the aggressors, the 
terrorists are at present by far the weaker party.  
By the same token, exhibitions of indecision, disunity and internal disintegration within this 
country have an exhilarating effect on the whole Fundamentalist movement. At each evidence of 
these tendencies, a thrill of hope and excitement goes through the terrorists’ world; a new 
jauntiness can be noted in the enemy’s tread; new groups of supporters climb on to what they 
can only view as the band wagon of international support; and extremist pressures increase all 
along the line in international affairs, threatening the stability of our allies and the world’s other 
moderate regimes.  
American behavior unassisted and alone may not command the power of life and death over the 
Islamic Fundamentalist movement and bring about the defeat of its worldview. But the United 
States has within its power to means by which to increase enormously the strains under which 
the terrorists’ policy must operate, to force upon them a far greater degree of open debate and 
empowerment of the disenfranchised than would be able to be expressed under their tyrannical 
rule. America can and must work with her allies to promote open dialogue, to offer up discussion 
among the voices of moderation and tolerance that will sow the seeds of individual thought and 
responsibility throughout the repressed populations in the Islamic world. For no movement that 
aims to dominate and control the human spirit—and particularly not that of the extremists 
Wahabbis—can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or 
another to the logic of the value of individual needs and wants.  
Thus the decision will really fall in large measure to the United States itself. The issue of 
defeating terrorist aggression is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as the 
most powerful of nations among a community of nations. To avoid destruction, the United States 
need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great 
nation. It must encourage open dialogue with the world as a whole, and allow the merits of 
freedom and democracy to be debated. Winning the struggle to diminish the appeal of terrorism 
will depend upon the strength of our conviction that all life is valuable and free, and that open 
debate is the best form of self-governance. At the same time, we must draw deeply on the 
American ethos of fighting when forced to fight, and actively opposing those terrorists whose 
aggression cannot be countered by debate alone.  
Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than to defend oneself against the 
absolutist doctrine of fundamentalism. The thoughtful observer of international relations will be 
clearly concerned with this threat posed by the emergence of terrorists willing and able to employ 
weapons of mass destruction. Steps must be taken to defeat this enemy, not merely to subsist 
alongside it. As during the Cold War, the American people have been presented with an 
implacable challenge, and our entire security as a nation is dependent on pulling ourselves 
together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly 
intended for us to bear.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
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address will be used for no other purpose. 
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